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1Abstract
This paper addresses the exploitative relationship seen amongst core-periphery areas as 
described in world systems theory through analyzing relations between Argentina and China as 
well as other trade partners. Looking at trends in trade, including general commodity trade 
statistics and trade of primary versus non-primary products, this study aims to demonstrate the 
growing treatment of Argentina as a periphery in relation to China as a core in contrast to 
Argentina’s relatively fixed status with the rest of its trade partners. The study also looks at 
Chinese investments in infrastructure that help support the idea of a core-periphery relationship 
from China’s growing influence in state matters. The study is able to conclude that Argentina is 
treated as a periphery in its relations with China as a core.
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3Introduction
Economic dependency has been an international issue since colonial times. Some nations 
will always be in better economic standing than others, and that can lead weaker nations to come 
to rely on the stronger ones, creating dependency. Wallerstein (1974) defines this model of 
economic dependency through his world systems theory, where nations are divided into subsets 
as core, periphery and semi-periphery areas. Weak and non-autonomous periphery areas become 
economically dependent on strong and independent core areas. This study will look at the trade 
relations that China and Argentina have with each other and among other countries to determine 
aptitudes as core or periphery areas. This topic became of interest after looking into the 
importance of China within the global economy. With its vast need for resources and rapidly 
expanding economy, China is particularly important in areas that produce lots of raw materials 
like Argentina. This is expected to demonstrate China’s capacity as a core and its treatment of 
Argentina as a periphery. The researcher will explore China and Argentina’s activities in the 
world economic system and whether Argentina acts as a periphery in relation to China. My 
hypothesis states that if Argentina is being utilized as a periphery by China, then trade 
asymmetries in type (primary products such as raw materials versus everything else) will be 
present between Argentina and China that do not exist with other trade partners. In dependency 
models, periphery areas focus their exports on raw materials and primary products and if 
Argentina is used as a periphery, that is what we expect to see. Trade patterns will be looked at 
among and between Argentina and China as well as in relation to other trade partners such as the 
United States, Brazil, and Mexico. This will show patterns of trade that can demonstrate a state’s 
aptitude as a core or periphery area; Argentina will be shown as a periphery and China will be
shown as a core. Trade asymmetries will be measured by looking at the types of exports/import 
to/from Argentina and to/from China in relation to each other and with other trade partners.
Literature Review
With the second largest economy in the world, China’s influence continues to grow 
throughout the world. This affects the entire international system; however, it is particularly 
relevant for countries that have strong ties with China. In particular, China has become 
increasingly significant to Argentina because of their strong relationship in trade and 
investments. Authors have differing opinions on the relationship between China and 
Argentina. Specifically, there seem to be two general ideas on this relationship: that 
Argentina is dependent on China or that Argentina and China are becoming interdependent 
on each other. To address this issue, the way countries operate in relation to trade and foreign 
investment must be understood. In particular to trade, Wallerstein’s world systems theory is 
critical in defining how nations interact with each other. Wallerstein (1974 A) asserts that a 
capitalistic world system based on colonial dependency was developed during the 16th 
century in which the world economy affects economic decisions and state entities with legal 
control affect political decisions. This world system is described as a limited social construct 
with recurrent conflicts; some states gain and others lose in a cycle of ups and downs as each 
state tries to get the upper hand (Wallerstein A 1974). This means that countries are 
constantly interacting in a way that defines advantages and disadvantages. This capitalist 
model makes it possible for constant economic expansion but also results in skewed 
distribution of the rewards. Because of this, he argues that our world is split by labor-
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divisions of core, periphery and semi-periphery areas. The core areas are the “advantaged” 
areas in which:
“the creation of a strong state machinery coupled with a national culture... serves both 
as a mechanism to protect disparities that have arisen within the world-system, and as 
an ideological mask and justification for the maintenance of these disparities” 
(Wallerstein A 1974, 349).
While this description seems cryptic, Wallerstein is merely referring to a sovereign 
state that is economically stable and militarily or politically powerful. A highly 
industrialized, strong and independent central government will be present in a core state.
This state will have the capacity to influence non-core areas and remain uninfluenced by 
other states because of its status.
The next classification Wallerstein describes is non-core areas known as periphery 
areas. These are areas with weak states and low levels of autonomy or sovereignty 
(Wallerstein A 1974). These areas tend to have weak central governments and infrastructure 
and a poor, unindustrialized economy, meaning that a states has very little economic and 
social growth to develop an industry outside of agriculture. These economies are usually 
based on one thing along, which are often raw materials. Similarly, semi-periphery areas are 
defined as in-between areas that may have been demoted from a core area or promoted from 
a periphery area to encompass a mediocre level of autonomy and homogenization. Other 
dimensions offered in the definition of a semi-periphery area are those such as “complexity 
of economic activities, strength of the state machinery and cultural integrity” (Wallerstein A 
1974, 349). This unequal distribution and exchange of advantages and disadvantages leaves 
core areas in a position to exploit and periphery or semi-periphery areas in a position to be 
exploited.
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Wallerstein developed this world systems analysis with help from many influences, 
including Fernand Braudel, an important figure in the Annales School of thought, the group 
of historians that stressed long-term social history. Braudel described the economic 
development throughout Europe between 1400 and 1800, helping create the development of 
the long term and capitalist world economy. Braudel actually critiqued Marxism heavily, and 
Wallerstein discusses Braudel’s critiques of Marxism in his original article on world systems 
analysis; Wallerstein suggests that while the Marxist official doctrine could ideally give us a 
better understanding of social reality, he agrees with Braudel that Marx’s theories tend to be 
dogmatic and defensive; the genius of Marx merely stems from being “the first to construct 
true social models, starting out from the long term (Wallerstein B 1974, 388). Braudel saw 
Marxist ideologies as something new and exciting rather than particularly insightful or 
helpful to explaining how the world works. Wallerstein conceptually differs from Marxism 
in such that the proper level of analysis is the world system, not the nation-state.
Furthermore, Wallerstein believes that labor control and thence class is defined by the world 
economy and the attempt to maximize export production (Denemark & Thomas 1988).
Lastly, there is dependency theory, a neo-Marxist theory which Wallerstein uses for 
its concepts of “core” and “periphery” throughout his world systems analysis (Sorinel 2010). 
Dependency theory is greatly credited to Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch dating back to 1949, 
in which they establish the idea that “the net barter terms of trade between primary products 
(raw materials) and manufactures have been subject to a long-run downward trend”(Toye & 
Toye 2003, 437). This means that primary products can have a negative impact on the host 
country’s trade, which contradicted the beliefs of most economists and long-standing beliefs
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of the time; this gave way to the dependency theory and the ideas of exploitation and 
advantaged (core) versus disadvantaged (periphery) areas (Toye & Toye 2003).
Authors like Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi and Andre Gunder Frank have all also 
been considered major thinkers and contributors to the world systems theory (Chase-Dunn 
1994). There are areas in which they all agree on, such as the existence of a capitalistic 
world system in which some countries are in better positions to reap the most benefit. On the 
other hand, certain aspects of the theory are challenged and disputed among scholars. For 
example, scholars disagree about what exactly capitalism includes and when it began. Amin 
argues that the modem world system was not created until the Sung era in China, Frank and 
Gills suggests the system is 5000 years old, and Wallerstein maintains it is rooted around 
1492 (Amin 2012). Whereas Wallerstein’s definition of the world system focuses on the 
division of labor, Frank and Gills suggest that trade of luxury goods is another important 
aspect that defines the system; this aspect along with the continuities seen by the creation of 
cities and states in Mesopotamia over 5000 years ago led these authors to believe that this is 
when the world system was created (Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995). In discussing modem 
Asia, Arrighi suggests that the capitalist aspect is not as important as Wallerstein and Amin 
have asserted (Amin 2012).
Furthermore, the conception of a world economic system versus empire has been 
debated and further defined. Wallerstein insists that there has not been a world empire since 
the rise of capitalism, and that a world economy can achieve more economic development 
because of the freedom to maneuver and appropriate resources—using capitalistic 
mannerisms and capacities (Skocpol 1977). Brenner suggests that while trade may have a 
minor role in the growth and development of capitalism, unequal exchange and exploitative
7
8relationships don not necessarily have to exist, or at least be harmful (Denemark and Thomas 
1988). Some authors maintain that a world empire in which a single core area dominates the 
entire world is not possible (Chase-Dunn & Babone 2006). Chase-Dunn (1994) asserts that 
rather than controlling the entire world, a hegemon merely controls a section of the core, and 
thus the periphery; a modem empire-formation has not occurred because of this—the core is 
made up of multiple states driven by capitalist accumulation which differentiates past 
empires such as Rome or China from the world system we know today (Chase-Dunn & 
Grimes 1995). Chase-Dunn discusses how a core power can become a hegemon, which he 
considers domination and not leadership. He considers the fact that there could be leadership 
if the world was not so unstable, constantly competing and full of wartime (Chase-Dunn 
1994). The author continues this idea by discussing the significance of cycles and trends of 
world-system change.
Wallerstein anticipated many of the criticisms scholars have of world systems theory 
by realizing that his concepts are really only fully applicable in a theoretical approach; his 
ideas are hard to apply and operationalize and thus, authors have debated over how 
theoretically rich and applicable the analysis is (Skocpol 1977). Lee (2010) mentions the 
most common critiques of world systems theory as:
“the way the emergence of the capitalist world-economy was handled; a 
perceived reductionism in the mode of argument; the treatment of how surplus was 
appropriated and accumulated, including the question of class; and the general 
exclusion of an analysis of any role for ‘culture’ with the associated concern for what 
seemed to some the Eurocentrism of the project” (3).
9Skocpol (1977) suggests that Wallerstein’s ideas are reductionist in two ways—that 
there is a reduction in “the socio-economic structure to determination by world market 
opportunities and technological production possibilities” and of “state structures and policies 
to determination by dominant class interests” (1079). Furthermore, it is suggested that 
Wallerstein attempts to use modem concepts to describe the past; his analysis is not 
explanatory but merely forcing history to adhere to his modem model (Snyder & Kick 1979).
As far as operationalizing Wallerstein’s analysis goes, scholars have looked at 
different ways of measuring the world system and the aptitudes of states as core, periphery or 
semi-periphery areas. Trade data are often looked at as a way to measure dependency and 
exploitation of core/periphery areas because of the reliance on economic relations in 
Wallerstein’s theory (Rossem 1996). Ways in which scholars measure this aptitude include 
looking at the amounts and types of imports and exports. For example, one country could be 
considered economically dependent if its exports to another country exceed a certain percent 
of its GDP, have a trade flow over a certain amount, or have a high or low amount of trade 
specialization (Rossem 1996). Other data involving trade have included: comparisons of 
trade volumes to specific countries of specific commodities, commodity trade statistics, 
equality or inequality of trade quantity and/or category, et cetera. Some scholars 
operationalize through a combination of factors; for example, Snyder and Kick (1979) look 
at trade flow, military  intervention, diplomatic exchanges, and conjoint treaty membership of 
different states to define the structure of the world systems analysis and core/periphery 
aptitudes. Other propensities for dependency have included political relations—particularly 
trade in major conventional weapons and presence of foreign troops—cultural, economic, or 
diplomatic influences, dependency on foreign and other investments, military interventions,
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treaties, or GNP per capita. (Rossem 1996; Snyder & Kick 1979; Smith & White 1992). Most 
scholars use some aspect of trade data to decipher how a state acts, as a core or periphery 
area; specifically, it seems that a focus on commodity trade flow is particularly present in the 
literature. Looking at overall trade flow does not capture the nature of trade like commodity 
trade flow does.
Methods
This study examines the relationship between China and Argentina compared to 
relationships with other countries in order to establish the aptitudes of core and periphery areas 
seen in China and Argentina. I have hypothesized that trade asymmetries exist between 
Argentina and China that do not exist between Argentina and other trade partners; specifically 
that China uses Argentina as a periphery to its core status by trading raw materials as opposed to 
finished goods. It is important to look at how trade in Argentina and China differ from each other 
and their trade partners in order to illustrate the significance of China as a core state and 
Argentina as a periphery.
The dependent variable for this study will be the status of a state as a core or periphery 
area, operationalized by Wallerstein’s definitions of such previously discussed. The researcher is 
assuming that China will take on the role as the exploiter—the powerful, sovereign state with 
economic stability and militarily or politically power—and Argentina will take on the role as the 
exploited—a weaker, less autonomous area with a poor and unindustrialized economy. This 
variable will be reliant on trade data found on Argentina, China, Brazil, Mexico and the United 
States; thus, the independent variables for this study consist of different types of trade data. The
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first independent variable will be China, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and the United States’ overall 
trade patterns of commodities (not services). These data will be looked at in past and present 
years (2000 and 2014) and operationalized in a few different manners: the value of exports from 
a country going to Argentina and that percentage of the country’s exports going to Argentina; the 
value of Argentina’s exports going to a country and the percentage of exports going to the 
country; the value of imports from Argentina to a country and that percentage of a country’s 
imports coming from Argentina; value of Argentina’s imports from a country and the percentage 
of Argentina’s imports coming from a country. These data will be analyzed through percent 
change to demonstrate changes that have occurred in the years 2000 and 2014 and the 
significance of such.
The second independent variable will look at the percentage of Argentina’s overall trade 
that consists of primary products, measured as a percentage of overall value in dollars. These 
data will be categorized to compare the exports and imports of primary versus non-primary 
products going/coming to/from China versus Brazil, Mexico and the United States. From these 
variables, I will be able to perceive the extent to which the Chinese-Argentinean relationship 
resembles a core-periphery relationship through trade dependency by looking at what trade 
asymmetries and patterns exist between the two countries that do not exist between other trade 
partners. The data for these dependent variables will be collected from the World Bank using the 
World Integrated Trade Solution Software.
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Findings
Like the literature shows, trade data is important in demonstrating economic dependency. 
Commodity trade has been particularly successful in demonstrating aptitudes as core or 
peripheries because it shows imbalances within the trade. Below are tables of trade data for 
Argentina and China as well as the United States, Mexico and Brazil in the years 2000 and 2014. 
Argentina’s value of imports from the world in 2000 was $25,280,000 versus 65,323,000 in 
2014; the value of Argentina’s exports to the world in 2000 was $26,341,000 versus 68,335,000 
in 2014. China’s value of imports from the world in 2000 was 249,203,000 versus 1,958,021,000 
in 2014; the value of China’s exports to the world was 225,094,000 in 2000 versus 
2,342,343,000 in 2014. T able One shows each country’s (China, Brazil, Mexico and the United 
States) value of worldwide exports and exports going to Argentina in 2000 and 2014. Table two 
shows the percentage of the each country’s exports going to Argentina. Table three shows the 
value of Argentina’s exports going to each country and the value of each country’s imports in 
2000 and 2014. Table four shows the percentage of Argentina’s exports going to each country in 
2000 and 2014. Table five shows each country’s value of imports coming from Argentina and 
the world in 2000 and 2014. Table six shows the percentage of each country’s imports coming 
from Argentina in 2000 and 2014. Table seven shows the value of Argentina’s imports from each 
country and the value of each country’s imports from the world. Table eight shows the 
percentage of Argentina’s imports coming from each country.
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Table 1: Argentina’s Export Values in 2000 and 2014
Country Value of 
exports to 
Argentina in 
2000 (US$ 
Bill.)
Value of exports 
to Argentina in 
2014 (US$ Bill.)
Value of exports 
to the world in 
2000 (US$ Bill.)
Value of exports to 
the world in 2014 
(US$ Bill.)
China 610,000 7,680,000 225,094,000 2,342,343,000
Brazil 6,238,000 14,282,000 55,119,000 225,098,000
Mexico 336,876 1,302,000 166,294,000 397,099,000
United States 4,700,000 10,826,000 780,332,000 1,619,743,000
Table 2: Argentina’s Export Percentages in 2000 and 2014
Country Percentage of 
exports going to 
Argentina in 
2000
Percentage of 
exports going 
to Argentina 
in 2014
Percent
Change
China .27 .33 22.22
Brazil 11.31 6.34 -43.94
Mexico .20 .33 65.00
United States .60 .67 11.67
Table 3: Export values from Argentina in 2000 and 2014
Country Value of 
Argentina’s 
exports to country 
in 2000 (US$ 
Bill.)
Value of 
Argentina’s 
exports to country 
in 2014 (US$ 
Bill.)
Value of imports 
from world in 
2000 (US$ Bill.)
Value of imports 
from world in 
2014 (US$ Bill.)
China 796,927 4,462,000 225,094,000 1,958,000,000
Brazil 6,991,000 13,881,000 55,851,000 229,060,000
Mexico 326,355 907,000 179,404,000 399,977,000
United States 3,149,000 4,040,000 1,258,080,000 2,346,041,000
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Table 4: Percentages o f  Exports Coming From Argentina in 2000 and 2014
Country Percentage of 
Argentina’s 
exports going to 
country in 2000
Percentage of 
Argentina’s 
exports going to 
country in 2014
Percent
Change
China 3.03 6.53 115.51
Brazil 26.54 20.31 -23.47
Mexico 1.23 1.32 7.32
United States 11.95 5.91 -50.54
Table 5: Import values from Argentina in 2000 and 2014
Country Value of imports 
from Argentina to 
country in 2000 
(US$ Bill.)
Value of imports 
from Argentina to 
country in 2014
Value of imports 
from the world in 
2000
Value of imports 
from the world in 
2014
China 929,990 5,247,000 225,094,000 1,958,000,000
Brazil 6,843,000 14,143,000 55,851,000 229,060,000
Mexico 247,213 1,050,000 179,404,000 399,977,000
United States 3,314,000 4,454,000 1,258,080,000 2,346,041,000
Table 6: Percentages o f  Argentina’s imports in 2000 and 2014
Country Percentage of 
imports coming 
from Argentina 
in 2000
Percentage of 
imports coming 
from Argentina 
in 2014
Percent
Change
China .41 .27 34.15
Brazil 12.23 6.17 49.55
Mexico .14 .26 85.71
United States .26 .19 26.92
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Table 7: Argentina’s Import Values in 2000 and 2014
Country Value of 
Argentina’s 
imports from 
country in 2000 
(US$ Bill.)
Value of 
Argentina’s 
imports from 
country in 2014 
(US$ Bill.)
Value of imports 
from the world in 
2000
Value of imports 
from the world in 
2014
China 1,157,000 10,703,000 225,094,000 1,958,000,000
Brazil 6,478,000 14,208,000 55,851,000 229,060,000
Mexico 583,000 1,639,000 179,404,000 399,977,000
United States 4,785,000 8,833,000 1,258,080,000 2,346,041,000
Table 8: Argentina’s Export Percentages in 2000 and 2014
Country Percentage of 
Argentina’s 
imports coming 
from country in 
2000
Percentage of 
Argentina’s 
imports coming 
from country in 
2014
Percent
Change
China 4.58 16.38 257.64
Brazil 25.63 21.75 15.14
Mexico 2.30 2.51 9.13
United States 18.93 13.52 28.58
From these data, we can see that Argentina’s imports coming from China has increased 
drastically from 2000 to 2014, with a percent increase of 285%. At the same time, China’s 
exports going to Argentina has stayed more stable with a percent increase of 22.2%. Argentina’s 
exports going to China has increased by a percent change of 115.51% and China’s imports 
coming from Argentina has decreased by a percent change of 34.15%. As far as its other top 
trade partner goes, Brazil, the results were quite different. Argentina’s imports coming from 
Brazil has decreased by a percent change of 15.14%. Brazil’s exports going to Argentina has
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decreased by a percent change of 43.94%. Argentina’s exports going to Brazil has also decreased 
by a percent change of 23.47 and Brazil’s percentage of imports coming from Argentina has 
decreased by 49.55%. Mexico’s exports going to Argentina has increased by a percent change of 
65%. Argentina’s exports going to Mexico has increased by a percent change of 7.32%.
Mexico’s imports coming from Argentina has increased by a percent change of 85.71%. 
Argentina’s imports coming from Mexico has increased by a percent change of 9.13%. The 
United States’ exports going to Argentina has increased by a percent change of 11.67%. 
Argentina’s exports to the United States have decreased by a percent change of 50.54%. The 
United States’ imports coming from Argentina has decreased by a percent change of 26.92%. 
Argentina’s imports coming from the United States have decreased by a percent change of 
28.58%.
There is concern that Argentina is falling into a trap of dependency within the realm of 
trade. Argentina has historically attempted to bolster its economy through agricultural exports. 
Between 2005 and 2007, Argentina produced 54.1 percent of the world output of all soy crops 
and byproducts; its percentage of GDP from the agricultural sector almost doubled from 2000 to 
2007 (Lence 2010). This growth in the agricultural sector, particularly with one product alone, 
suggests that Argentina is focusing more heavily one one-commodity trade. It is this potential 
reliance on one commodity and one country that warrants the suggestion that Argentina should 
bolster its economy through trade diversification (Bekerman and Dulcich 2013; Bekerman, 
Dulcich and Moncaut 2014; O’Connor 2012). Export diversification would allow Argentina to 
discover unexplored comparative advantages that would make it more competitive within the 
global market. Bekerman and Dulcich (2013) and O’Connor (2012) demonstrate that Argentina 
has made a marked shift toward soybean trade with China. In 2010, 79 percent of Argentina’s 54
million tons of soy bean produced go to China; this is a massive increase from the 12 million 
tons produced in 1995 (O’Connor 2012). Because of this recent shift, the authors suggest that 
Argentina has a strong comparative disadvantage within its manufacturing sectors; Argentina is 
putting all its eggs in one basket—the soy basket—so to speak. Roughly 15 percent of 
Argentina’s total exports are soy-related (soy-beans, soy-bean oil-cake and other solid residues, 
soybean meal and soybean oil) (World Bank, 2015). This means that its manufactures and 
industrialized sectors are neglected for the sake of producing and exporting soy. This further 
entraps Argentina in its status as a periphery and reliance on China as a core nation because of its 
reliance on primary products and lack of industrialization and growth in other sectors. In order to 
look at this exploitation and dependency, the second independent variable analyzes trade of 
primary versus non-primary products; a core-periphery relationship can be shown through an 
imbalance of trade in this manner.
The second independent variable utilizes four graphs that show the change in Argentina’s 
overall exports of primary products in 2000 and 2014, the change in Argentina’s exports of 
primary products to each country in 2000 and 2014, the change in Argentina’s overall imports of 
non-primary products in 2000 and 2014, and the change in Argentina’s imports of non-primary 
products from each country in 2000 and 2014.
17
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Figure 1: Bar graph showing Argentina’s overall exports o f  primary products over time
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For the year 2014, the percentage of Argentina’s overall exports that were primary 
products was 25.93%. As for exports to China in 2014, 80.37% of Argentina’s exports to China 
were primary products. For Brazil, it was 10.19%—a striking difference between Argentina’s top 
two trade partners. As for Mexico and the United States, Argentina’s exports that were primary 
products were 4.65% and 40.01% respectively in 2014. These values were quite different 14 
years earlier; in 2000, Argentina’s overall exports that were primary products were 33.26%. In 
the same year, 69.54% of Argentina’s exports to China were primary products and 33.72 percent 
of Argentina’s exports to Brazil were primary products. In the cases of Mexico and the United 
States in 2000, Argentina’s exports that were primary products were 4.17% and 27.71% 
respectively. This shows a decrease in percent change of Argentina’s overall exports that were
Figure 2: Bar graph showing Argentina’s exports o f  primary products over time
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primary products of 22.03%; a decrease to Brazil of 69.74%; an increase to China of 15.57%; an 
increase to Mexico of 11.51%; an increase to the United States of 44.39%.
For 2014, the percentage of Argentina’s overall imports that were not primary products 
was 94.35 percent. As for imports from China in 2014, 96.97 of Argentina’s imports from China 
were not primary products—they were capital, consumer and intermediate goods such as 
machinery and electronics. For Brazil, Mexico and the United States, the percentages were 
92.4%, 98.79% and 97.17%. Again these values were different 14 years ago; in 2000,
2000 2014
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Figure 3: Bar graph showing Argentina’s imports o f  non-primary products over time
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Argentina’s overall imports that were not primary products were 93.45. In the same year, 
95.88% of Argentina’s imports from China were not primary products, 92.39% of Argentina’s 
imports from Brazil were not primary products, 96.09% of Argentina’s imports from Mexico 
were not primary products, and 96.95% of Argentina’s imports from the United States were not 
primary products. This shows a decrease in percent change of Argentina’s overall exports that 
were primary products of 1.30%, a 0% change with Brazil, an increase to China of 15.57%; an 
increase to Mexico of 2.81%; an increase to the United States of .23%.
Discussion/Analysis of Results
For the independent trade variables, many asymmetries are evident in type and amount. 
While Argentina’s overall percentage of exported primary products and primary products 
exported to its number one trading partner, Brazil, have decreased from 2000-2014, exports of 
primary products to China have increased. Furthermore, both the percentage of Argentina’s 
imports coming from Argentina and the percentage of Argentina’s exports going to China have 
more than doubled while its exports to and imports from Brazil, its other top trading partner, 
have both slightly decreased. Argentina’s imports from Mexico have barely changed and have 
decreased from the United States. This demonstrates China’s growing importance in the 
Argentinean economy and Argentina’s other trading partners’ increasing insignificance, which 
allows for the susceptibility of being exploited because of the growing dependence on one crop 
and one country shown through the evidence surrounding Argentina’s soy trade with China. In 
this case, this means that China is using Argentina as a periphery to its core status, more for 
primary products such as soy than ever before.
Argentina’s percentage of overall imports that are not primary products has decreased, 
and its imports of non-primary products have not changed from Brazil, increasing slightly from 
Mexico, the United States and China. This does not signify any causal relationship, especially 
because the margin of change is only about one percent in both, and this does present interesting 
findings. It could have been expected that if a periphery’s overall imports of non-primary 
products decreases, their overall aptitude as a periphery would decrease; however, this could also 
suggest that Argentina’s aptitude as a periphery is more so dependent on its increase in primary 
product exports to China versus other countries. It is possible that what Argentina imports from 
China is not as important as how much it is importing and what and how much it is exporting to 
China. It seems likely that China’s great demand for soy is causing Argentina to accommodate 
China by producing more soy and thus changing its makeup of exports. Argentina has in fact 
changed its makeup of exports, specifically within the realm of primary products, because com 
has become decreasingly important as China’s demand for soy has become more important. 
China’s increase in exports of non-primary products such as consumer or capital goods could 
have an impact on Argentina’s domestic market, overall trade patterns as well as its interactions 
with other states.
As far as asymmetries in amount of trade between China, Argentina and other trade 
partners, it is difficult to decide what kind of an impact this can have. While an unequal balance 
of trade does not necessarily signify an exploitative or even dependency relationship, the rate at 
which Argentina’s exports/imports to/from China has sky-rocketed while the opposite has been 
true for China. China seems to be diversifying its trade partners while Argentina has honed in on 
China.
22
23
Argentina’s general aptitude as a periphery area within the world has debatably remained 
the same—its percentage of overall primary product exports has decreased by about 13 percent, 
yet its percentage of overall non-primary product imports has remained practically the same.
This is where China seems to have an impact—Argentina has become more of a periphery within 
its trade with China.
As far as other supplementary evidence goes, there have been extensive amounts of 
Chinese investment in Argentina’s infrastructure. In helping rebuild infrastructure and railroads, 
China benefits by making the transportation of its imported primary products like soy more 
quickly and easily accessible and transportable—not to mention cheaper. China has made a vast 
amount of contributions to Argentina’s railroad systems. In 2012, the World Bank Group made 
note of the great amount of trade agreements between the two states. Furthermore, they suggest 
that “Argentina’s pursuit of US$19 billion from Chinese infrastructure investors indicate that 
Chinese sponsors may become more active in Argentina the near future” (2012, 4). Looking at 
Chinese monetary commitments and involvement in Argentina, it seems that China has upheld 
this expectation. According to the Transport Politic, China made a $10 billion commitment to 
improving railroads in Argentina in 2010. The article declares that China will contribute $4.35 
billion to renovations of railroads and $1.85 billion to the Belgrano line,
“which links the country to Bolivia and is an important link for the nation’s agricultural 
producers. China undoubtedly wants to expand its access to Argentina’s productive 
farmland” (Freemark 2010).
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Because railways are less costly than road transit, China wants to create better and more 
efficient rail systems to potentially make trade cheaper. The more transportation connections 
Argentina has both within its borders and with other countries makes trade more effective, 
particularly for farmed products. Furthermore, the article states that the Chinese investment, 
coming from the Chinese Development Bank, requires a 15 percent match in investment of the 
project (Freemark 2010). In the same year, ties between the two countries became strained over 
trade. China imposed a ban on Argentinean soy supposedly because of poor quality, but it is 
widely thought of as retaliation for protectionist policies put in place by Argentina against 
Chinese products (BBC 2015, Bloomberg News 2010). Argentina had enacted restrictions on 
imports, specifically textiles in order to protect its domestic industry from being overwhelmed 
with cheap foreign stock (BBC 2015). Luckily for Argentina, the two nations were able to reach 
an agreement through negotiations in which China agreed to import Argentinean soy so that 
stronger bilateral relations could be established. Additionally, another tie developed between the 
Chinese Development Bank and the National Bank of Argentina set up a credit line worth $150 
million (Hall 2010). In 2011, imports of railroad materials and trains from China to Argentina 
were $50 million versus $700 million in 2014— a 1400 percent increase over four years (Romero 
2015). In 2014, the Chinese Development Bank further loaned Argentina 7.5 billion dollars at a 
point when other creditors were very hesitant or refused to give loans to Argentina (MercoPress 
2014). It included a 2.1 billion dollar loan to finance rail projects that would increase efficiency 
in transportation of grains from the farmlands to the port (MercoPress 2014). Other agreements 
include currency swaps in 2009 and 2014 between the central banks of both countries so that 
Argentina can pay for Chinese imports with Chinese currency (MercoPress 2014). As cited in the
MercoPress article, “the exchange will mainly serve to facilitate investments in the currency of 
the country providing the funds and to strengthen the level of international reserves,” (Argentine 
Central Bank 2014). Other more recent investments include a 2015 deal for China to fund and 
construct two nuclear power plants in Argentina—a deal worth 15 billion dollars (Anderlini and 
Rathbone 2015). Since 2007, all of these investments have led to 19 billion dollars of lending for 
Chinese-led infrastructure projects (Anderlini and Rathbone 2015).
Part of China’s $10 billion commitment to rebuilding infrastructure in 2010 was solely 
for the economic benefit of Argentina; this included improving Buenos Aires’ public transport 
systems such as the metro (Freemark 2010). This suggests that Argentina has given China 
extreme preferential trade treatment and access to its agricultural and primary sector. This is yet 
another example of China inserting itself into the inner and outer working of Argentina and 
could explain why trade has so dramatically increased between Argentina and China, particularly 
in Argentina’s exports of primary goods to China and its imports of non-primary goods.
Conclusions
This study aims to examine aptitudes as core and periphery areas as seen in China and 
Argentina, demonstrated through trade. I have hypothesized that Argentina acts as a periphery as 
China acts as a core because of trade patterns seen between the countries and other trade partners 
in different years. Argentina now exports more primary products to China than to anyone else in 
the world and Argentina’s top importer in the world is China, the majority of which Argentina 
imports soy or other primary products. Argentina relies more on China as China relies less on
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Argentina. Argentina does not necessarily see any incentive to change as its economy becomes 
less diversified, autonomous and strong, creating a further entrapment of dependency. Increases 
in spending on transportation systems in Argentina and an increase in Chinese contributions to 
railroad funding have also helped further establish this core-periphery relationship. This 
relationship can be seen drastically changing between China and Argentina whereas it cannot be 
seen in between Brazil, Mexico or the United States with Argentina; no country’s relationship 
with Argentina has changed as drastically as China’s has. The differences between China and 
other partners in relation to trade with Argentina are significant. Particularly, it is significant that 
both Brazil and Argentina are top trade partners for one another yet Argentina is not a top trade 
partner for China; again, Argentina is minutely significant to China whereas China is critical for 
Argentina. The comparison between trade partners is interesting because it suggests that 
Argentina has the aptitude for eventually escaping—or at least not worsening—its status a 
periphery area to be exploited, yet it chooses to as China persuades Argentina to remain 
dependent through trade negotiations and investments in infrastructure.
This research demonstrates China’s progressive movement into its capacity as a core 
power—as it gains advantages within the global economy, it finds other areas to take advantage 
of. Considering how quickly China’s success and economy has grown, this demonstrates 
Wallerstein’s claim that positions of core and periphery areas change over time, and can happen 
quite quickly as the distribution of gains and losses or advantages and disadvantages changes. 
China is a particularly interesting case to study in terms of world systems theory because of its 
lack of ties to colonial dependency. There are no instances in which China was seen as a core 
power, excluding world empires, during and after colonial times until most recently. Traditional 
core states, as Wallerstein suggests, have their ties to colonialism, like the United States and
Great Britain. These states as core aptitudes and creators of economic dependency and 
exploitation make sense, but China could be considered a new type of core since it never had the 
same history.
Limitations in this study include lack of information on specific expenditures on 
infrastructure both in/by Argentina and by China in Argentina. Further research should look at 
different aspects of dependency and or exploitation to further clarify the Argentinean-Chinese 
relationship as well as both countries’ relationships with the world. Additionally, research could 
be done to look at trade between Argentina and other core areas, such as the European Union, 
Japan, and/or Australia in comparison to China in order to demonstrate how Argentina’s aptitude 
as a periphery has changed. More data points for the years in which data was looked at could be 
collected to give more of a sense of a pattern. Data could include other types of trade between 
the core states and to other peripheries to show how core nations interact and impact the global 
market. This would not only show how Argentina has developed, but would also give more 
insight into China’s development as a core state. Further research could also be done to look at 
other areas China is using as peripheries, particularly in Latin America because Latin America 
has historically been very slow to grow and develop.
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